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Abstract
User-contributed content as an input to the production of informa-
tion services is not new, but it is growing rapidly in significance and
prevalence. Open-source software, Wikipedia, and Flickr are but a few
examples of the variety of information products and services relying
on user-contributed content. I propose a characterization of user-
contributed content, and identify contributor behavior issues critical
for success. From the perspective of an information service provider, or
the economy as a whole, these issues predict underprovision of content,
inefficient mixes of quality and variety, and undesirable levels of con-
tent pollution. How might we design information services or systems
to ameliorate these problems? Given the centrality of autonomous,
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motivated human behavior in user-contributed content problems, I ar-
gue this is a problem for incentive-centered design: how to configure
economic, social and psychological incentives to induce contribution,
discourage pollution, and motivate sufficient effort to generate qual-
ity? To illustrate, for a content pollution problem loosely based on a
popular Web site’s experience, I offer a stylized mechanism that relies
on user-contributed (meta)content to screen out polluting contribu-
tions.
At this dark and hopeless
moment an inspiration burst
upon him! Nothing less than a
great, magnificent inspiration
. . . . There was no lack of
material; boys happened along
every little while; they came to
jeer, but remained to whitewash
. . . .And when the middle of the
afternoon came, from being a
poor poverty-stricken boy in the
morning, Tom was literally
rolling in wealth.
Mark Twain, The Adventures of
Tom Sawyer
1 Let’s whitewash the fence!
We are seeing the rapid growth of an unusual form of information production
on the Internet. The defining characteristics are that much of the information
provided by a producer is donated to the producer, by people not employed
by the producer. There are several names for this production technology;
I favor user-contributed content (the content creators are often users of the
resulting resource).1
1Other common names for this phenomenon iare “user-generated content”, consumer-
generated media, and user-created content.
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Many information producers now significantly (though rarely exclusively)
rely on the user-contributed production model. Many are successful and quite
socially valuable. Well-known examples include (the user contribution is
highlighted in parentheses) Google (www.google.com, links to Web resources
are the data for the PageRank algorithm ); Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.org,
encyclopedia content); Amazon (www.amazon.com, product reviews); Flickr
(www.flickr.com, photos); Digg (www.digg.com, editorial selection of news
stories); del.icio.us (del.icio.us, recommended Web sites); CiteULike and
Bibsonomy (www.citeulike.org and www.bibsonomy.org, scholarly cita-
tions), and, of course open-source software projects such as Linux and the
Apache web server. Less familiar but important examples include the new
Peer2Patent (http://www.peertopatent.org, patent commenting system),
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/),
and the WorldCat (http://www.worldcat.org/, world-wide library cata-
loguing). Of course, far more projects do not generate revenues greater than
their costs (even with so much of the production cost donated by volunteers)
and thus are short-lived.
Providing product created and donated by volunteers seems like a great
idea; why didn’t anyone think of this before? Of course, the idea is not en-
tirely new. Tom Sawyer’s friends and neighbors whitewashed Aunt Polly’s
fence for him.2 Public radio is produced with resources donated by listen-
ers. User-contributed content is clearly related to the private provision of
public goods [Bergstrom et al., 1986]. The current burst of user-contributed
content on the Internet exhibits some interesting features, however. For ex-
ample, most prior examples involved monetary donations, not raw material
or finished production (information content). Likewise, prior examples were
typically produced or managed by a non-profit or government agency; much,
perhaps most donated Internet content is given to for-profit firms. Further,
when the donation is content rather than money, quality is a crucial concern.
In fact, Tom Sawyer’s model is quite apt: in-kind donations to a private
producer, with a significant concern for quality.
2 They even paid him for the privilege of providing volunteer labor: an apple, a dead
rat on a string, “part of a jews-harp, a piece of blue bottle-glass to look through, a spool
cannon, a key that wouldn’t unlock anything, a fragment of chalk, a glass stopper of
a decanter, a tin soldier, a couple of tadpoles, six fire-crackers, a kitten with only one
eye, a brass door-knob, a dog-collar – but no dog – the handle of a knife, four pieces of
orange-peel, and a dilapidated old window sash” [Twain, 1876, pp. 32–33].
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She found the entire fence
whitewashed, and not only
white-washed but elaborately
coated and recoated
Mark Twain, The Adventures of
Tom Sawyer (emphasis added)
Evidently, the success of a content provider who relies on user-contributed
content requires solving at least two problems: getting the good stuff in, and
keeping the bad stuff out.
2 What is user-contributed content?
To understand the economic issues invoked by the rise of user-contributed
content on the Web, we need to define the concept. I use: information con-
tent as a production input, provided at least in part by people without direct
extrinsic compensation (as would be conventional employees or commercial
suppliers). These input providers are often, but need not be, consumers of the
final product, thus the sometimes appropriate label “user-contributed”. By
extrinsic I mean measurable, transferable compensation, for example money
or an in-kind payment (barter). By direct I mean a more or less contrac-
tual specification of the relationship between the amount of input provided
and the compensation. A typical example of direct compensation would be
payment of a fixed fee per 1000 words of content (such as might be the
compensation to a free-lance writer).
Why do we need such a detailed definition of the type of compensation?
In most economic articles we might just write “without compensation”. I
qualify compensation with “extrinsic” because we cannot rule out intrin-
sic compensation. If we limited ourselves to contributions made without any
compensation (in the sense of personal gain received), we would only consider
contributions made accidentally or out of pure altruism: this is surely too
great a restriction, ruling out much (perhaps most) user-contributed content.
I allow for the possibility that contributors experience some form of intrinsic
compensation, which might include “warm glow” from (impure) altruism, or
something else (such as social respect or acquisition of a professional repu-
tation).
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In addition, and especially important in some settings, we want to con-
sider cases in which contributors may receive indirect yet extrinsic compen-
sation: some benefit from the final product that is not contractually (even
informally) tied to their contribution but that they believe does depend in
some informal manner on their contribution. For example, contributors may
believe that they have a marginal impact on the survival or quality of a
product which they value as a consumer. One often observes contributors
describing themselves as members of a community and suggesting that con-
tribution by themselves (or all members of the community) is essential if the
community is to survive. Such statements suggest an equilibrium based
on generalized reciprocity.3
Another common type of indirect compensation occurs when content con-
tribution plays (at least) two productive functions: one as an input to the
producer’s effort, one as an input to the contributor’s utility function. That
is, the contribution, while costly for the contributor to make, may also pro-
vide some personal benefits. This is the case, for example, with certain
types of shared indexing services, such as del.icio.us (a cross-referenced
index of user-contributed Web bookmarks). When a user posts bookmarks
to del.icio.us, she is contributing to that firm’s product, but she is also
storing her bookmarks in a database that she can access from any network-
connected device with a browser, which many users value as an alternative
to a bookmark database that is locally stored on a single device [Rader
and Wash, 2006]. This contributor is extrinsically (in-kind) but not directly
compensated by del.icio.us; rather, she benefits indirectly through the
personal use she can make of her own stored bookmarks.
Thus, to admit a wide range of interesting examples, and focus on what
distinguishes them from other arrangements for input supply, I shall limit
user-contributed content to those inputs that would be contributed even if
the only compensation is either not extrinsic or not direct (or neither).
We need not rule out the possibility that a producer would choose to
provide direct extrinsic compensation, but I am concerned primarily with
applications in which the producer usually chooses not to do so. For example,
the Encyclopedia Britannica pays its authors, but it is not necessary to do
so in order to create a high-quality encyclopedia: Wikipedia does not. Both
producers need content as an input; Wikipedia could have chosen to pay for
3I do not here explore whether there is a rational basis for a contributor’s perception
that she receives indirect benefits, but see, for example, [Jian and MacKie-Mason, 2006].
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content. Evidently, Wikipedia at least implicitly made an economic decision
to rely on user-contributed content rather than paying, but I will not be
concerned with that decision in this article.4 Rather, I will consider producers
who for some unexamined reason choose to rely on user-contributed content.
Before proceeding, let me note that I focus on information content (“con-
tent” for short) as the contributed input because there is an interesting and
growing set of applications specific to information content. In other set-
tings “users” could contribute other inputs to production (e.g., raw natural
resource materials, semi-finished goods, etc.), suggesting the possibility of a
more general theory of contributed factors of production, but I do not address
that possibility here. There are two other common types of contribution —
monetary and labor — that I shall briefly discuss to focus attention on the
distinct characteristics of contributed content.
Monetary contributions are a familiar phenomenon, usually referred to
as charitable giving. Some have much in common with user-contributed
content applications. For instance, donations to a public radio station result
in an open-access information product, and contributors benefit indirectly
from the consumption of the final product. At least two economic questions
relevant for user-contributed content are studied for monetary contributions:
why contribute, and how much? I will refer to this literature below. One
typical distinction, however, is that monetary contributions usually are to
non-profit organizations, whereas information content is often contributed to
profit-seeking entities. This may be significant because of the role of intrinsic
compensation to motivate contribution. Another important distinction is
that money is (largely) homogeneous, whereas content contributions usually
are heterogeneous in their quality.
Labor contributions are also familiar. Like money, they are often ob-
served in charitable contexts. For example, many people with valuable skills
donated time and energy to assist victims of Hurricane Katrina with med-
ical, shelter and other needs. Thus, as with money, labor contributions to
non-profit activities are distinguished from content contributions to for-profit
activities. There is another way in which labor and content contributions are
4There might be a variety of economic rationales for such a decision. For example,
contracting, accounting and payment costs may be too large if a large number of individuals
are contributing small amounts of content. There is some evidence (and considerable
popular conjecture) that providing direct extrinsic compensation for certain efforts affects
the motivations of the provider and may have an adverse impact on the quantity or quality
provided.
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quite similar however: they both can be heterogeneous in quality (for labor,
how skilled is the worker? how hard does she work?). Indeed, in one sense it
makes sense to think of content contributions as labor contributions: much
or most of the resources used to create the contributed content may be the
labor it took to create, find, or otherwise produce the content. Nonetheless,
that the labor was used to produce information distinguishes it from labor
supplied to other production functions because of at least two peculiar char-
acteristics exhibited by information content. First, it is nonrivalrous. Once
created, information generally can be used by many without diminishing its
value to any. Second, it is approximately true for most information content
that it can be costlessly reproduced after the original instance has been cre-
ated. When contributed labor is used to construct a house by Habitat for
Humanity, on the other hand, the resulting house can generally be used by
only one (appropriately-sized) family, and a second house will require approx-
imately as many resources to create as did the first. Thus, user-contributed
information content typically is distinguished from most labor contributions
when the information is contributed to for-profit entities, and when the in-
formation is nonrivalrous or (approximately) costless to reproduce.
3 A stroll through Web 2.0
Tim O’Reilly coined the expression “Web 2.0” in 2003 to refer not to a new
version of Internet protocols, but to a new style of application development
and a new mode of user interaction on the Web [O’Reilly, 2005]. Web 2.0
is not well-defined, but one common use refers to the family of emerging
information services that rely heavily on user-contributed content.
Reliance on user-contributed content is common, but also diverse: it is
the foundation for a wide variety of firms.5 The “life-cycle of information”
(see Figure 1) is a common characterization of the many different types
of information producers. Some create information (novelists, rock bands,
scholars); others publish and distribute (Random House, MGM); still others
maintain inventories and provide access to end users (libraries, video stores),
and so forth. User-contributed content supports businesses operating in each
5I use “firm” loosely to refer to any non-governmental organization producing a product
or service for use or consumption by others. Such firms may be for-profit or not-for-profit.
The form of organization may be relevant to some decisions about user-contributed content
as a production input, but I do not address it in this article.
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of these different markets. See Table 1) for illustrative examples.
Well-known user-contributed content successes such as Wikipedia, Linux
and Flickr demonstrate breakthrough contributions to social welfare. Lesser-
known services suggest that this form of production may have a wide and
deep impact on knowledge production and use. For example, most schol-
ars now rely heavily on at least some forms of online collaboration [Finholt,
2003]. arXiv.org is an early and successful example, started as a pre-print
server at Los Alamos National Laboratories, and now hosted by Cornell.
This archive served initially the high-energy physics community, and now
hosts over 450,000 e-prints in physics, mathematics, computer science, com-
putational biology and statistics. The Social Sciences Research Network
(SSRN) provides a similar service to economics, law, accounting and related
areas, with over 130,000 e-prints.
Other types of scholarly production services are emerging. For example,
CiteULike, Bibsonomy, and Connotea are social bibliographic services to
which scholars upload and share their bibliographic databases. To illustrate, I
uploaded some of my bibliographic data files in BibTeX format to BibSonomy
(see Figure 2). I can search my own citation database or those of others by
user, popularity of the cite, or user-supplied tags (see Figure 3). I can then
select and download cites in (currently) more than 15 formats (see Figure
4). Crucial determinants of the value of this service, and thus its long-
term success, are the quantity of references provided by the users (so that
I can easily find citations I need), their quality (whether they are properly
formatted and accurate), and the effort users make to provide useful tags for
searching.
Another emerging area with tremendous potential is in the provision of
user-contributed metadata. With the flood of information now accessible,
there is a crucial need for information about the information (metadata)
that facilitates organizing, finding, retrieving, annotating (and other func-
tions that comprise an idealized “semantic web” Shadbolt et al. [2006]). The
Library of Congress without a classification system would be largely useless;
efforts to impose a hierarchical, controlled vocabulary metadata schema on
Internet-accessible content have proved futile. For example, few web page cre-
ators provide the simple Dublin Core [Weibel and Koch, 2000], PICS [Lessig
and Resnick, 1999] or P3P [Cranor, Nov.-Dec. 2003] metadata necessary for
standardized and widely-respected efforts to create controlled vocabularies.
Uncontrolled vocabulary efforts (folksonomies) such as tagging on informa-
tion sharing sites (e.g., del.icio.us, Flickr, LibraryThing) may support the
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Stanford Encycl. of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu encyclopedia
Linux www.linux.org operating system
Publishing
Public Library of Science www.plos.org Scholarly research
Selecting
Digg digg.com news
Cloudmark www.cloudmark.com spam filtering
YouTube www.youtube.com video finding
Indexing
CiteULike www.citeulike.org citation records
del.icio.us del.icio.us URL bookmarking
dmoz www.dmoz.org Web directory
Storing
Flickr www.flickr.com photos
Gmail mail.google.com email, files
Xdrive www.xdrive.com files
WalkerTracker walkertracker.com pedometer records
Finding
Amazon www.amazon.com books, merchandise
iTunes www.apple.com/itunes music finding, distribution
LinkedIn www.linkedin.com business contacts
Using
Swivel www.swivel.com share, use datasets
RateMyProfessor www.ratemyprofessors.com aggregate evaluations
MediaPredict mediapredict.com prediction market
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semantic web but only with effective incentives for users to contribute, and
for the community to develop a semantically-workable vocabulary [Rader and
Wash, 2006].
4 What are the economic issues?
A firm that wishes to obtain user-contributed content as a production input
faces at least three fundamental economic problems: obtaining contributions,
and managing their quality, and handling contributions of inappropriate or
harmful content (such as unsolicited advertising, the most common type of
“spam”). The first two I refer to as “getting the good stuff in”: since the
firm seeks content in exchange for little or no monetary compensation, it is
not assured of obtaining enough (or any) input. The third problem I refer
to as “keeping the bad stuff out”.6
4.1 Quantity
The first, and perhaps most obvious economic challenge, is inducing people
to contribute their content creation efforts with no direct or extrinsic com-
pensation. However, having recognized that user-contributed content is just
another input factor for production, why is this a special challenge? Why is
this not simply the usual task of negotiating a price with an input supplier?
Every producer would like to get a zero price (holding quality constant).
We might want to give special attention to the problem of inducing con-
tent contribution with zero payment if socially valuable products or services
will become available only when the content is contributed. For example,
6Taxonomies are never perfect, and this one is no exception. It is reasonable to argue
that there are really only two types of problems: obtaining contributions, and managing
their quality. If we think simplistically of quality falling along a gradient from high posi-
tive values to low negative values, inappropriate or harmful content is simply lower down
the gradient, and need not be seen as a separate problem. However, much of the existing
literature in economics tends to treat the problem of markets for a gradient of positive-
valued qualities (e.g., “good”, “better”, “best”) separately from the threshold problem
of discouraging or eliminating negative qualities (e.g., pollution). From a modeling view-
point, the most useful distinction is probably between gradient problems and threshold
problems, and I would probably adopt this taxonomy in a more formal analysis. However,
that is not the only distrinction: there are also intersecting issues concerning information
asymmetries: who knows the quality of a contribution, and when?
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Wikipedia is produced by the Wikipedia Foundation, a non-profit that does
not publish advertising, and that to date has had (donated) revenues suf-
ficient to employ no more than ten people. Without contributed content,
there is little doubt that a minimally-funded foundation could produce an
encyclopedia with more than 2 million English entries, and versions in over
253 separate languages [Wikipedia contributors, 2007].
However, I do not find this argument by itself very compelling. First, it
is not obvious that any or many socially valuable products or services could
not recover the costs of their production. Assuming the social benefits from
use of Wikipedia are larger than the social costs (for the most part, of the
time spent by writers and editors), it is reasonable to think that generally
there will be ways to extract enough of the surplus to cover the costs of
production. In the Wikipedia example, one obvious mechanism to consider is
site advertising, such as that found on Google or Yahoo! search result pages.
Certainly the many for-profit firms obtaining user-contributed content (e.g.,
Amazon) have means for extracting value from users of the content.
I think the circumstance that usually distinguishes procurement of user-
contributed content from other production inputs is the transaction cost of
providing direct, extrinsic compensation to contributors. Most prominent
examples of user-contributed content involve relatively small contributions
by a relatively large number of contributors.7 Providing direct, extrinsic
compensation requires establishing a reliable business relationship, typically
including a contract, a monitoring and accounting process, and a payment
system. This is more costly than the already difficult problems that challenge
micropayments systems: before making payment it is necessary to agree
on terms and condition, and to measure the amount (and quality) of the
provided content. It seems reasonable that the costs of setting up supplier
relationships and managing them with all of the individuals who provide
book reviews might exhaust the benefits to Amazon (or Netflix, or Flickr,
&c.) from the contributed content.
Thus, when the number of contributors is large and the value of their
contributions relatively small, the producer is faced not with a question of
how much to pay content providers, but whether it is possible to induce
contributions without compensation, or do without the content altogether.
7Wikipedia reports over 5.8 million registered writers and editors, and also permits
anonymous, unregistered users to edit [Nov, 2007]. The number who have edited at least
once appears to be about 4 million [Almeida et al., 2007].
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Finally, before proceeding to quality issues, it might seem that in some
cases there is no quantity problem, that is, that producers do not need to do
anything to induce contributions. For example, scholars want their research
articles to be published, distributed and read, and generally will create the
content and offer it (along with copyright) to publishers. However, as long
as there is some competition among publishers, they still have a quantity
problem: a given publisher needs to induce content creators to contribute to
it, rather than to a competitor.
4.2 Quality
Quality is a vague label that encompasses a complex array of characteristics,
whether the factor be information or any other product or service. We of-
ten distinguish between “vertical” and “horizontal” qualities. Vertical refers
to characteristics on which everyone agrees in their preference ordering: a
monotonic gradient from worst to best [Mussa and Rosen, 1978]. An ex-
ample for information might be its degree of objective accuracy. Horizontal
refers to characteristics on which preference orderings vary: some people pre-
fer red, some blue, and a few chartreuse [e.g., Lancaster, 1966].8 One central
problem for the producer is to induce contributors to provide a desirable mix
of horizontally- and vertically-differentiated qualities.
The best method for managing the mix of contribution qualities critically
depends on observability (or, if quality is to be contracted upon, verifiabil-
ity). If the producer costlessly can observe input quality when provided, then
the problem is largely one of production planning: what mix of qualities is
desirable (e.g., will support the most profitable output mix)? For example,
what is the distribution of article accuracy a newspaper publisher wants to
maintain, and what diversity of viewpoints does she want to express? If the
qualities are identified, the problem is reduced to multiple contribution quan-
tity problems. To see this, label information of different qualities (vertical or
horizontal) as different goods: the producer needs to induce contributors to
donate the desired quantity of different types of information inputs.
Suppose, however, that quality characteristics are not (costlessly) observ-
able (ex ante, referring to the point at which a transaction is consummated)
or verifiable (ex post). That is, suppose there is asymmetric information of
8Still others care deeply about the difference between chartreuse green and chartreuse
yellow, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chartreuse_(color).
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the hidden characteristics type [Stiglitz, 2000] about the quality dimensions
of contributed content. The problem of obtaining the desired quantities of
different quality types becomes more difficult, since the producer also needs
to learn what the qualities are. This is the problem of “evaluating the stuff.”9
A related but somewhat different problem also is important when there is
asymmetric information about quality. Offering a user-contributed content
product can be much the same as offering a free publication and distribution
vehicle. As long as the producer can observe quality costlessly, the use of
this vehicle can be limited to the publishing and distribution goals of the
producer. When quality is unobservable, content contributors have an op-
portunity to hijack the platform for their own publishing ends. For example,
when a blog writer allows readers to freely comment on posts, the writer
soon discovers that many comments posted are commercial advertisements
for unrelated products, that is, spam. Thus, with asymmetric information
the quality problem is not just one of obtaining enough of the desired quality
mix, but also of preventing (or otherwise managing) contribution of undesir-
able content. This I call the problem of “keeping the bad stuff out.”
Let me summarize. Producers of information products or services may
choose to obtain some inputs to production in the form of user-contributed
content. This falls into the familiar domain of obtaining factors of produc-
tion. By seeking this content without directly compensating the contributors,
however, the producer faces several challenging problems. First, she needs
to obtain the desired quantity of inputs (with the understanding that con-
tent of different observable qualities can be thought of as different types of
input). Second, if quality is not costlessly observable, she needs to evaluate
contributions, either directly (to then select which contributions to use), or
indirectly (by inducing contributors to provide a desirable mix of qualities).
Third, because her product is attractive to others as a low-cost publishing
platform, she needs to discourage or prevent contributions of material that is
harmful to her goals. Collectively, I summarize these challenges as “getting
the good stuff in” and “keeping the bad stuff out”.
In the remainder of this article, I will discuss two of these three problems:
getting the good stuff in and keeping the bad stuff out. These problems
9The evaluation performed may be direct, by the producer, or indirect, if the producer
induces contributors to self-select the quality they provide, or otherwise honestly reveal
their quality information. Many of the mechanisms economists design for heterogeneous
quality problems assume that monitoring is impossible or too costly to be worthwhlie, and
thus focus on inducing the contributors to self-evaluate.
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naturally arise because the direct rewards for contributing, and (largely to
minimize disincentives to contribute) the protective walls are also low. Eval-
uating is a complex and wide-ranging problem better treated elsewhere.10
4.3 Getting the good stuff in
If the individuals are self-interested, then there is an intrinsic incentive to
free-ride. Why and when would autonomous individuals take actions that
benefit others without being (directly or explicitly) compensated for provid-
ing the benefit? Why, for example, does someone take the time to write a
detailed book review and post it to the Amazon site?11 Why make the effort
to label and then share bookmarks with others (del.icio.us, Markaboo,
furl, etc.) [Rader and Wash, 2006]? In other literatures this is known as
the problem of community contribution: how to get users to actively partic-
ipate in, for example, wikis (open-access group written documents), or open
source software development projects [Finholt, 2002, Olson and Olson, 2003]?
Economists refer to this as the private provision of public goods [Bergstrom
et al., 1986]
The theory of the private provision of public goods depends on partici-
pants receiving some degree of intrinsic personal benefit (e.g., garnering rep-
utation or experience), which sometimes may be sufficient incentive. Lerner
and Tirole [2002] propose this motive to explain programming effort donated
to open source software projects: programmers obtain experience in a profes-
sional group development setting, and their work is documented so they can
show potential employers their accomplishments. Resnick et al. [2006] found
through a human-subject controlled field experiment on eBay that in public,
semi-anonymous Internet settings reputation-garnering provides meaningful
incentives for socially beneficial behavior.12
10The topic of evaluation invokes economic research on reputation, recommendation,
and signaling and screening, among other topics. I am not aware of economics literature
that discusses these issues as they apply to user-contributed content, but for related work
that starts the conversations, see Riley [2001], Resnick and Varian [1997], Resnick et al.
[2000]. I discuss signaling and screening below as they apply to keeping out undesirable
content.
11Harriet Klausner has contributed over 15,000 reviews to Amazon. Quite a few others
have contributed more than 1000 [Amazon.com, 2007b].
12This was not an experiment in the private provision of a public good in the sense of
contributing inputs to joint production. Rather, the authors were testing a reputation
system’s effectiveness at generating motivation for private behavior. See also Resnick and
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Another example in which users derive some direct personal use benefit
from their contributions is the photo storage and sharing site, Flickr (owned
by for-profit Yahoo!). The number of photos taken about which people do
not have proprietary concerns (for either perceived marketable value or pri-
vacy) appears to be astronomical (over two billion to date, since inception in
2004, Reuters [2007]. One direct user benefit is that Flickr provides free stor-
age; another, perhaps more important (since local hard disk space is getting
very inexpensive) is that this storage is accessible from any network-attached
computer (so users can, for instance, see their photo collections while they
are at work, or while traveling). A related benefit is that Flickr makes it
easy to share photos with friends and family (which I consider to be a direct
personal benefit, different from the benefit that unknown users receive from
access to one’s photos). Flickr provides a variety of organizational tools to
help users manage their collections (such as tagging, which is simpler and
faster than categorizing according to a controlled vocabulary). By making
contribution and metadata provision easy, Flickr keeps the net contribution
cost sufficiently low that vast numbers of amateur photographers are willing
to contribute content. Rader and Wash [2006] document that direct private
benefits are an important motivation for del.icio.us contributors, who use
it to maintain a portable, tagged index of web site for their own use.
Attention to the cost of contributing, as well as to the benefits, likely
is important for inducing user contributions. MacKie-Mason et al. [2000]
found that the costs of using a standard, relatively simple interface to an
online scholarly journal service can be as important as typical intellectual
property fees for the service. Particularly in settings in which it is difficult
to provide direct extrinsic incentives such as monetary transfers, it is natural
to attend more to lowering the costs of participating (or of providing higher
quality).
Other motivations for contribution likely are important as well. Social
psychologists attend to the role that individual conceptions of social identity
and norms of collective effort play as intrinsic motivators. For example,
in the CommunityLab project (communitylab.org) a team of economists,
social psychologists and computer scientists has been testing mixtures of
economic mechanisms, computer algorithms, and user interfaces to provide
improved incentives for participation and quality, both by increasing intrinsic
motivations and by lowering offsetting costs of and barriers to participation
Zeckhauser [2002], Dellarocas et al. [2004].
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[Ling et al., 2005, Harper et al., 2005, Rashid et al., 2006].
Economic theory suggests that relying solely on intrinsically-motivated
private provision of public goods will result in socially-inefficient underprovi-
sion, and thus mechanisms to induce greater contributions to the public good
will increase social welfare. A large body of theoretical and experimental re-
search specifically addresses the design of extrinsic motivation mechanisms to
induce greater philanthropic contributions [see, e.g., Andreoni, 2006]. There
is little work yet on the transferability of these results to settings in which
the contributions are in content, not cash (and thus in which quality charac-
teristics are also important), and even less work on ways to increase intrinsic
motivations sufficiently to maximize social welfare.
4.4 Keeping the bad stuff out
A producer soliciting user-contributed content often tries to lower the costs of
contribution by offering a simple, easy access content collection system. Fur-
ther, in many applications, the producer will spend little or nothing on con-
tent selection or editorial functions, instead making most contributed content
available to consumers.13 For example, anyone can post a book or product
review to Amazon, and this content will appear to all users shortly thereafter
immediately [Amazon.com, 2007a]. This system provides an open access pub-
lishing platform (albeit with limited functionality), and some might want to
publish information other than book or product reviews. For example, a pub-
lisher might wish to post a pseudonymous “book review” that is in fact just
an advertisement for the publisher’s products. Email is another relatively
open-access publishing platform, and in that context we refer to unsolicited
and unwanted advertising as spam. The phenomenon is widespread, and has
lead people to coin terms for it in other information product or service con-
texts, such as splog or blam (unsolicited advertisements in blog comments),
spim (instant messaging), spamdexing (online indices), sping (blog pings),
m-spam (mobile phones), spit (voice-over-internet telephony).
As mentioned above, this is a common problem for user-contributed con-
tent because two conditions often hold: some agents want to contribute con-
13One of the interesting responses to low-quality content is to solicit user-contributed
meta-content. For example, Slashdot and many other discussion or commentary fora do
not select or edit content, but let users rate contributions so that readers can filter and
see only content that other users have rated above a chosen threshold. I apply this idea
in my example model below, Section 5.
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tent that has negative value to the producer, and the producer offers an
open publishing platform. When these obtain, the producer faces a special
instance of the quality management problem: how to keep out content that
has negative value. This is closely related to the classic pollution or negative
externality problem: some agent wants to engage in an activity productive
for itself (here, for example, advertising), but in so doing imposes costs on
others (here, the producer providing the publishing platform) without bear-
ing (internalizing) those costs.
For traditional pollution problems, the Coasian efficient bargaining so-
lution generally fails due to undefined property rights and high transaction
costs, so many mechanisms focus on these problems [MacKie-Mason, 2000].
Property right ambiguity is not a central problem for user-contributed con-
tent in most applications. Ownership of the producer’s publishing platform
is usually well-established. Likewise, the content supplier’s copyright over
content is usually clear enough; in any case, uncertainty about the content
creator’s copyright does not explain why production is organized to rely on
content inputs donated by their creators.
Bargaining costs, on the other hand, are often significant. As I discussed
above, a defining characteristic of production based on user-contributed con-
tent is that there are many input suppliers, most of whom are providing a
small quantity of the producer’s inputs. Contracting, monitoring and trans-
acting payments with hundreds or thousands of microsuppliers to internalize
their externalities typically will be too costly to support. We may not need
to look beyond transaction cost economics to understand why supplier con-
tracting is not employed to reduce or eliminate polluters.
Nonetheless, transaction costs are not the only, and perhaps not even the
most important problem for producers who want to limit user-contributed
pollution. With user-contributed content the pollution problem is compli-
cated by the coincident presence of the private provision of public goods
problem. That is, the producer wants to induce productive content contribu-
tions but simultaneously to discourage polluting contributions. Mechanisms
implemented to discourage pollution must be sufficiently discerning that they
do not overly discourage good contributors as well; conversely, mechanisms
to encourage good contributions must not too greatly encourage polluting
contributions. Providing different incentives for different types of behavior
is not a problem, unless it is difficult to distinguish between the two types
of behavior. But this is precisely the problem with much user-contributed
content: quality is not costlessly observable, so there is an evaluation prob-
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lem: how to distinguish good from bad content at low cost and before the
pollution has imposed a cost on the producer?
For example, one way to reduce the amount of contributed pollution
would be to charge contributors a fee for publishing their content, much as
some governments tax polluters per ton of effluent. However, to succeed
such a system would necessarily need to monitor content and distinguish
between pollution and good content, because the producer does not want
to charge suppliers of good content.14 If monitoring is low cost, such a
system (or even simply blocking polluting content) might work, but in many
settings the quantity of information contributed is so large and the qualities
so diverse that monitoring is too costly to fully solve the problem. For
example, Amazon has rules characterizing permissible content contributed in
the form of product reviews and will remove postings it discovers that violate
these terms of use. But there have been several documented (and surely a
large number of undocumented) instances of interested parties falsely posting
“arm’s length reviews” to promote purchases of their own, friends or clients’
products [Dellarocas, 2006, Harmon, 2004]. Evidently the cost of detecting
this kind of misrepresentation is sufficiently high that Amazon chooses not
to monitor enough to keep all pollution of this sort from its site.
Thus, because information is an experience good, information pollution
typically is accompanied by a hidden information problem: the polluter is
better informed ex ante about whether his content is polluting or desirable
to different classes of affected users.
Loder et al. [2006] proposed a signaling device to reduce unwanted bulk
email advertising (spam), which they called an “attention bond mechanism”.
The identifying characteristics of costly-to-observe pollution are present: re-
cipients incur a cost (reading time, security risk) to determine whether the
message is desired, and the sender generally has a better prior estimate of
the message’s expected value. Email senders are required to post a revocable
bond. Given a greater likelihood that a recipient will claim a spammer’s
bond, and appropriate selecting the size of the bond, the cost for a good
sender to signal its belief that the recipient wants to see its mail will be suf-
14Of course, the producer would be delighted if it could obtain desired quantities and
qualities of its content inputs while simultaneously charging the suppliers for providing
the inputs, but rarely is a business sustainable if it charges its suppliers for the privilege
of providing inputs. Vanity presses are one (small) niche in which this model is sometimes
successful. Of course, fictional Tom Sawyer was paid handsomely by friends who wanted
to whitewash his fence; see footnote 2, above.
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ficiently lower that they will be willing to comply and send email, whereas
bad senders will be discouraged.
Ben Chiao and I also addressed the email spam pollution problem, but
with a somewhat novel economic mechanism [Chiao and MacKie-Mason,
2006]. We show conditions under which offering an alternative, even lower
cost (and higher quality) platform for advertisers to distribute their spam
might induce enough to divert their advertising to the alternative channel,
simultaneously lowering the value of the regular email channel for other spam-
mers, until all spam has moved elsewhere.
Rick Wash and I showed that password authentication to information
resources works to the extent the passwords satisfy the necessary economic
condition for effective screening mechanisms [Wash and MacKie-Mason, 2007]
. We also demonstrated that the increasingly popular CAPTCHA system is a
screening device, and its success depends on satisfying the necessary economic
conditions for screening.
When user-contributed pollution is a problem in repeated interaction
environments, a reputation mechanism might be an appropriate design re-
sponse. A reputation mechanism works like an implicit bonding system: in
an equilibrium in which a better reputation leads to higher value transactions
(on average), the cost of foregoing those value premia in the future by sacri-
ficing reputation now with a polluting action may be higher than the benefit
of the pollution. Of course, for a reputation or other implicit-bonding
mechanism to work in a repeated interaction environment, it is necessary to
have persistent (pseudonymous) identifiers for contributors [Friedman Eric J.,
2001].
5 Example: Keeping the bad stuff out
I will illustrate the application of incentive-centered design concepts to the
problem of keeping undesirable content out of an information service that
relies on user-contributed content. For concreteness, I situate this application
in the context of Digg.com, which is a news aggregation service.15 Users
submit news stories, and then readers vote for those they think are worthy
of attention. The stories with the top vote counts during a time interval are
promoted to the “front page” which users see first. Display on the front page
15There are several similar services. Slashdot.org is perhaps the best known in the
information technology community; Reddit is also popular.
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typically leads thousands to go read the referenced news story (the “Digg
effect”).16
One of the interesting features of Digg is that it obtains as production
inputs two levels of user-contributed content: the posted news stories, and
the voting metadata. Over the past two years there have been numerous
assertions that some users on Digg have been polluting or manipulating the
voting system in order to manipulate the promotion of their preferred stories
to the front page. One of the more interesting examples concerns a story that
Google was about to announce its acquisition of Sun Microsystems [Green,
2006]. Whether there were serious discussions of this possibility at one or
both companies I do not know, I am unaware of any confirming stories,
and in the event, such an acquisition did not occur. It is not clear if this
was a stock price manipulation scheme, but after reaching the front page
of Digg, the story was picked up by mainstream media with greater reach,
and it appeared there was a stock price response to the rumor. Whether or
not this was a successful manipulation of Digg through voting pollution, it
has been widely discussed as a possible problem with Digg reliability, along
with several other incidents mostly involving efforts to publish self-promoting
materials for personal commercial gain [Sandoval, 2006].
Digg makes money by selling site advertising, and depends on being able
to draw users to see the ads, which in turn no doubt depends on (among other
things) the extent to which users have confidence in the veracity, quality and
independence of highly rated news stories. I will now present a simple model
of Digg’s problem with an incentive-centered system design which in this
overly simplified, illustrative setting, provides a reasonable solution for Digg.
Many of the specific concerns about Digg have focused on the voting system
through which users elevate the visibility of stories, but for this example I
focus on the underlying issue: the quality of the stories submitted to Digg
in the first place (before user voting).
5.1 A model
Suppose there are two types of content suppliers: Truthtellers and Liars,
which I will indicate with subscripts: τ ∈ {T, L}. Truthtellers always post
true stories, and they have no personal stake in the content of the story. Liars
16See., e.g., Fadial [2007], who documents an increase from about 200 daily visits to
2000 hourly visits to his web site after his article was promoted to the top of the Digg
front page.
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always post stories that are less desirable (to Digg, and to its readers) than
stories posted by Truthtellers. Suppose that in the population of potential
suppliers there is a fixed and known fraction of Truthtellers, denoted by
0 ≤ p ≤ 1. When suppliers contribute an article, they experience some
benefit (indirect, non-extrinsic motivation for contributing); for simplicity I
assume all Truthtellers experience a value of vT from contributing a story,
whereas Liars experience a value of vL. Digg benefits, presumably, by drawing
readers to the web site, and then earning advertising revenues; I assume that
in equilibrium, stories posted by Truthtellers generate more viewing traffic
and thus more profit for Digg (say, because some users who discover they
are reading low quality stories posted by Liars do not return to Digg in
the future). The expected net value to Digg of a posted story is πτ , with
πT > πL. Depending on the actual quality of stories posted by Liars, and
on the severity of the reaction by Digg’s readers, πL could be positive or
negative; for the analysis below it is only necessary that it be less valued by
Digg than Truthteller contributions.17 I will show below that whether πL is
positive or negative has interesting implications for the interpretation of the
results.
Now suppose that Digg implements the following practice: to contribute
(post) a story, a supplier must deposit a fee per story of φ into a Digg-
managed account. Digg then encourages readers to cast a binary vote on the






Digg then calculates a score, ρ(|α|,
∑
αi), for each contributed story, with
|α| the cardinality (count) of the set of votes, and
∑
αi the number of votes
17It makes sense to allow stories contributed by Liars to have positive value most im-
portantly because “Liar” was chosen merely as a catchy label: the stories may have lower
quality, but not actually be lies. Of course, even stories that are lies (or that are supplier-
self-serving advertisements) may have positive value to Digg: news that is false may attract
repeat readers as long as it is entertaining or controversial enough, as we know from the
longevity of various tabloids.
18For this model, it does not matter whether the content of a story is actually truthful
or not; simply that there are two vertically-differentiated qualities, and so that Digg values





1 if |α| < 20,P
αi
|α| if |α| ≥ 20.
Every story starts with a score of one (“truthful”) until some threshold num-
ber of votes are submitted (set arbitrarily to 20 in this example). At that
point, the score is simply the ratio of positive votes to total votes. After some
specified period of time, Digg returns the deposit (φ) if the score is above a
threshold, ρ > ρ̄, with ρ̄ determined and announced in advance by Digg.
Given this mechanism, Digg’s incentive design problem is to choose {φ, ρ̄}
to maximize its expected value function. To calculate this, we need to model
the probability distribution of scores. For a story contributed by a supplier
of type T , there will be some probability that a reader correctly will rate the
story as truthful, a residual probability that the reader incorrectly will rate
the story as not; similarly for stories contributed by type L suppliers. From
these primitive probabilities, Digg can arrive at an estimate of the probability
distribution that generates an observed score (when the number of votes is
above the threshold). If the votes are drawn from i.i.d. distributions, then
the score distribution will have the form ρτ ∼ f(µτ , σ2τ (|α|)), in which the
variance is decreasing in the number of votes (|α|). To simplify, I henceforth
condition on the number of votes made as of the moment of the analysis,
and suppress that argument. I assume that the votes are weakly informative
signals and are positively correlated with the actual value of the story, so
on average the score for a story contributed by a Truthteller will be higher
than the score for a Liar: µT > µL. The cumulative distribution function is
Pr(ρ ≤ ρ̄|τ) ≡ Fτ (ρ̄), which is the probability that a supplier loses its deposit
(that is, that the score is below threshold). I assume that not only is the
mean score higher for Truthteller contributions, but that the distribution of
scores for Truthtellers first-order stochastically dominates the distribution for
Liars, so that for any threshold ρ̄ the probability of a score below threshold
is greater for contributions posted by Liars: FL(ρ̄) ≥ FT (ρ̄).
Now I can write down Digg’s design problem. Content suppliers receive
expected utility EUτ = vτ − φFτ (ρ̄), and Digg solves
max
ρ̄,φ
p(πT + φFT (ρ̄)) + (1− p)(πL + φFL(ρ̄))
s.t. vT − φFT (ρ̄) ≥ 0 (Participation Constraints)
vL − φFL(ρ̄) ≥ 0
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if both types τ ∈ {T, L} contribute. The maximand is a straightforward
statement of Digg’s expected value per contributor, given a fraction p of
Truthtellers in the population, the value from stories of types T and L, and
the fee (φ) and deposit return likelihood (Fτ (ρ̄)). The participation con-
straints reflect the fact that suppliers can decline to contribute if their ex-
pected utility is less than zero.19 The participation constraint corresponding
to that type does not need to be satisfied if Digg is content with that type
not participating.
5.2 Results from introducing user-contributed (meta)content
The problem above is a fairly standard incentive or mechanism design prob-
lem, and can be solved straightforwardly by calculating the first- and second-
order conditions and manipulating them. I will summarize the results here,
and sketch their intuition (full proofs available upon request). Let me make
one more restrictive assumption; I will discuss its relaxation after present-
ing the main results. Assume, for Results 1–3, that the intrinsic value to
a supplier of contributing an article is the same for Truthtellers and Liars:
vT = vL.
Result 1 The participation constraint is binding for Liars: vL = φFL(ρ̄).
This is a standard result in hidden characteristic mechanism design prob-
lems. From the Participation Constraints above, and given the assumptions
of first-order stochastic dominance and vT = vL, we see that the expected
utility of a T type is always at least as large as that of an L type. Thus, if the
participation constraint for Liars was not binding, Digg could, for example,
raise the deposit φ until it does bind, without changing the participation de-
cision by either type, yet increasing Digg’s expected value (since Digg keeps
the forfeited fees). In the mechanism design literature, this result is often
referred to as “no information rent” for the less desirable type: if Digg is to
share surplus with either type, it should be with the type that provides the
more valuable content.
Result 2 The participation constraint is not binding for Truthtellers: vT >
φFT (ρ̄).
19The reservation utility, or “outside option” available to suppliers may be worth some-
thing different than zero, but we can normalize to zero without loss of generality by adding
or subtracting a constant to or from vτ on the left side of the participation constraint.
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Truthtellers keep some rent; that is, Digg shares more of the value created
by Truthteller stories than is necessary to induce Truthtellers to contribute.
This is a standard result in mechanism design, and can be explained with
the following intuition: Whether a particular supplier is a Truthteller or a
Liar is ex ante unknown to Digg. Therefore, Digg must treat all contributors
the same (non-discrimination); in particular, φ and ρ̄ cannot depend on the
supplier’s type. Thus, from the Participation Constraints, if Liars get zero
expected utility (Result 1, Truthtellers must get positive expected utility.
Digg can only extract more value from Truthtellers by putting them on a
different contract, and but since Truthtellers can pretend to be Liars, they
would not admit they are Truthtellers and sign a different contract unless it
yielded as much expected utility to them as does being on the same contract
as Liars. In other words, Digg would have to pay them this amount of rent
to get Truthtellers to admit their type anyway, so there is no gain to Digg
from trying to differentiate between them.
Result 3 If πL + vL < 0 then set φρ̄ marginally higher to exclude participa-
tion by Liars.
I mentioned above that the model is flexible enough to handle content
contributions from Liars that have positive value for Digg, as long as the value
is less than for Truthteller contributions. But it also accommodates situations
in which the value from Liar contributions is negative (πL < 0): what I above
called “user-contributed pollution”. If the value is negative enough, so that
πL + vL < 0, then Digg will actually want to exclude the Liar’s content
altogether.20 It can do so simply by either increasing the fee (φ), or the score
threshold below which the supplier forfeits the fee (ρ̄); it turns out that these
two parameters are only determined up to a multiplicative constant, so that
Digg is effectively choosing their product (φρ̄).
Why is the critical test for whether to let Liars contribute whether πL +
vL < 0? Put another way, why ever let Liars participate if the value they
create for Digg is negative, that is, whenever πL < 0? First, it is straightfor-
ward to see why the result emerges: by Result 1, φFL(ρ̄) = vL. Make that
substitution into Digg’s maximand. The only place that πL and vL appear
is as a sum in the second expression, and indeed this expression becomes a
20Below I explain why πL < 0 is insufficient for Digg to want to exclude Liar contribu-
tions.
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constant. Since (1 − p) is non-negative, Digg is better off by having Liars
participate as long as πL + vL > 0.
The intuition is also straightforward, and revealing. The expression
φFL(ρ̄) is the amount of its deposit that the Liar expects to forfeit to Digg.
This has the obvious interpretation of a payment from Liars to Digg. As long
as −πL < vL = φFL(ρ̄), the Liar is in expectation paying Digg more than
the cost that it imposes with its negative-valued content contribution.
We have arrived at a sensible, intuitive result, one we normally call ad-
vertising ! The Liar type gets some benefit from publishing its content to
DIgg. Digg itself may get negative value directly from the content, but will
be willing to publish it if the price is right. Indeed, this is what Digg does
already with some content: it names a price to buy advertising space, and
will display material that typically lowers the value of the site for Digg’s users
on behalf of advertisers willing to pay the price (as does Google, etc.).
What is different from the current design of Digg and similar information
products or services? Although Digg does offer advertising space for sale, it
also offers an open, free publishing platform to anyone who wants to sub-
mit “news stories”. Just as our inboxes are open publishing platforms and
product sellers stuff them with their ads rather than limit themselves to paid
channels like newspaper advertising, so do some contributors to Digg choose
to publish their advertisements (or other self-serving content) rather than
pay for advertising space. They can do this because Digg, apparently, has
concluded that hiring employees to “evaluate the stuff” that is contributed,
in order to screen out ads, is too costly to justify. The mechanism described
above provides an evaluation method that is less expensive. In fact, it is a
method that relies on user-contributed (meta)content as an input to produc-
tion of the monitoring: the votes submitted by content users. Combining
user-contributed (meta)content with direct extrinsic penalties (rather than
positive compensation) offers the promise of a low-cost, robust system for
monitoring quality, and enables Digg to either exclude the bad stuff or, if if
the suppliers of bad stuff value publishing it sufficiently, to charge a price for
publishing the material as ads.21
21If the current “truthfulness” vote score is displayed alongside the article, much as the
current “Digg” score is displayed to indicate a story’s popularity, then potential readers
will have an indicator of whether the content they are considering is advertising or not.
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5.3 Extending the model
This is a very simple model, with many issues to be addressed before be-
fore implementing such a scheme. One that is now quite obvious: adding
only a second dimension of quality distinction to Digg’s own “up or down”
(popularity) voting does not cover all of the quality issues likely to concern
the producer. I labeled this dimension as “truthfulness”, somewhat playfully
but also inspired by the Google-Sun merger “news” story posted on Digg.
The particular mechanism, however, distinguishes material that readers vote
down on some (ambiguous) criterion (“truthful”, “not self-serving”, &c.),
which the producer then publishes if the contributor is willing to pay more
than the average cost to the producer of including content of this type. Of
course, a producer might be willing to publish commercial advertising for a
price, but still prefer not to publish advertising that is false or misleading, or
racially insensitive, &c. Thus, we can see opportunities to entrain users to
contribute meta-content that ameliorates some of the problems of an open
publishing platform, but more sophisticated solutions for multiple dimen-
sions of quality become increasingly costly and unwieldy. User-contributed
editorial services may be an important element in future information services
and publications, but they are not a panacea.
I have also set aside obvious questions about the motivations of the users.
In the model above, I assume that a sufficient number of readers will be
motivated to submit votes. I further assume that those who vote will for
the most part be motivated to vote honestly.22 Without some motivation
for voting, and for honesty, the score will not be a very good (perhaps even
perverse) signal of the underlying type of the contributed content, and the
mechanism will not work well. Thus, there is another incentive-centered
design problem to be addressed: how to motivate contribution and quality
by the user contributors of meta-content (“truthfulness” votes). Gazzale
[2005] provides results for a related problem in reputation systems: how to
motivate consumers to rate (and rate honestly) service provided by sellers?
Imagine there are enough motivated voters, but they do not reliably vote
their true opinion. For example, let there be a sizable number of naysay-
ers, such that the score for “truthful” articles is expected to fall below the
threshold 50% of the time. It might be quite hard to get good contributors
22A closely related question is how accurate the readers are in their assessments of
the intrinsic “truthfulness” of the posted story: giving honest reports that are too often
incorrect will be a problem as well.
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to provide stories if they believe that they will have to pay a fee of φ/2 on
average for posting. Of course, the threshold can be adjusted if there is a
systematic bias towards nay-saying, but the fundamental problem remains:
the signal must be sufficiently discriminatory (in statistical decision parlance,
have low enough Type I error and low enough Type II error) to be able to
keep the expected cost of posting low for good articles, and sufficiently high
for bad articles.
In fact, I assumed that all Truthtellers had the same preferences as each
other, and likewise for Liars. In this simplification, we need only find a
vote scoring scheme and expected penalty that separates the two groups: all
Truthtellers are willing to participate, and all Liars either are not willing, or
are willing to pay the (advertising) fee to participate. In a real system we
will expect different Truthtellers to have different willingness to participate
(indicated in the model by vT ), and likewise for Liars; then the more chal-
lenging task will be to construct a combination of vote scoring rules and fee
level that generates a desirable mix of Truthteller and Liar content (that is,
not discouraging too much of the former, and not overlooking too much of
the latter).
I made another simplifying assumption just before stating the results
above: that the benefit from posting an article is the same for Truthtellers
and Liars (vT = VL). Just as I allowed in this discussion above that different
Truthtellers might value posting differently, so, of course, may Truthtellers
and Liars differ in their desire to post. If the willingness to post differs (I will
just discuss the simpler case in which that willingness is common across all
contributors of a given type), nothing material changes as long as Truthtellers
care more about posting than do Liars: vT > vL. The problem becomes
somewhat easier for the producer, in fact, because now a given fee (will rel-
atively less likely to dissuade Truthtellers and more likely to dissuade Liars.
However, things can get more complicated if Liars have a higher willingness
to post, which we might expect to often be the case (if, for example, Liars
stand to gain commercially from posting their advertisements): vL > vT . If
the gap is not large, but results above still hold, but if the gap gets large
enough then the producer faces the problem known as “countervailing in-
centives”.23 For intermediate gaps between vL and vT , it becomes desirable
to raise the expected fee (through some combination of raising φ and low-
23Wash and MacKie-Mason [2007] discuss the implications of countervailing incentives
in a related application of incentive-centered design to security systems.
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ering the threshold for a rebate, ρ̄), which reduces the content provided by
Truthtellers (in extreme cases, perhaps to zero), thus reducing the value of
the overall system. As the gap gets large enough, this system will not work
very well and the producer will choose to set parameters so that more and
more undesirable content gets in (rather than shut out all desirable content).
However, at that point, if the value to bad contributors of getting in is high
enough, it can become possible to identify them and use other designs to
reduce the value to them of participating (e.g., isolating their stories to a
special quarantine that suggests a pejorative connotation and reduces their
financial gain from posting the stories).
6 Incentive-centered design for user-contributed
content
User-contributed content as an input to the production of informations ser-
vices or goods is not a new phenomenon, but it is growing rapidly in signifi-
cance and prevalence. In this article I proposed an economic characterization
of user-contributed content, and identified a variety of economic issues aris-
ing from its characteristics. In a descriptive analysis, these are issues that
would lead us to expect socially inefficient under- or overprovision of user-
contributed content, or inefficient mixes of quality and variety. I turn to
a normative, design perspective: given that basic market forces do not au-
tomatically lead to efficient quantity or quality when a producer relies on
user-contributed content, in what ways might we design information services
or goods to ameliorate these problems? The latter is the problem of incentive-
centered design; in this article I focused on economic incentives, but I hasten
to add that social and psychological incentives may be equally or more useful
to the designer.
The characterization of user-contributed content I use is that it is informa-
tion content provided as an input to product (generally of some information
good or service), provided at least in substantial part by people who receive
no direct extrinsic compensation: for example, no contract specifying quan-
tities and qualities (or even hours of creative effort), and no cash payment
per unit of quantity or quality.
A producer who wishes to obtain user-contributed content inputs — that
is, to engage in “Tom Sawyer production” — will need to face a variety
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of economic problems. First, how to obtain the desired quantity of input,
when supplier are not (directly and extrinsically) paid for their supply ef-
forts? Second, given that some content is contributed, how to manage the
mix of qualities, especially given the pervasive asymmetric information prob-
lem known as hidden characteristics : the suppliers know both the horizontal
and vertical quality dimensions of what they are contributing better than
does the producer obtaining this content as an input. Third, given that ser-
vices relying on user-contributed content often function as open publishing
platforms for the contributed content, how is the producer to deal with pol-
lution, such as advertising content that has zero or even negative value to
the producer, but positive value to the content supplier? Collectively, I refer
to these problems as getting the good stuff in, and keeping the bad stuff out.
I worked out an example to illustrate how incentive-centered design might
address some of these problems in a specific context. I focused on a prob-
lem of “keeping bad stuff out”, that is, information pollution. In so doing, I
allowed extrinsic payments to be sometimes made (though perhaps never or
rarely in equilibrium), in the form of posting a bond that would be returned
if other users collectively determined that the contributed content was not
polluting. The particularly interesting feature of the proposal is that the pro-
ducer solicits yet a second type of user-contributed (meta)content — ratings
on a particular quality dimension of user content contributions — and uses
this meta-content as an input to the editorial function of selecting or catego-
rizing information inputs. Thus, the potentially enormous task of screening
content (often supplied by thousands or even millions of suppliers in rather
small chunks) may be outsourced to volunteers: user contributors of editorial
screening.
The example addresses but one of the several design problems I identified,
and only a special case of that problem (pollution), and in a very stylized
setting. There are considerable opportunities for further work on incentive-
centered design for user-contributed content services.
References
R.B. Almeida, B. Mozafari, and J. Cho. On the evolution of wikipedia. In
Proc. of the Int. Conf. on Weblogs and Social Media, 2007.




Amazon.com. Top reviewers, 2007b.
James Andreoni. Philanthropy. In S-C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, editors,
Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, pages 1201–1269. North
Holland, Amsterdam, 2006. URL http://econ.ucsd.edu/~jandreon/
WorkingPapers/Philanthropy.pdf.
Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Edward Blume, and Hal Varian. On the
private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 29
(1):25–49, January 1986. URL http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1024%26context%3Dpostprints.
Benjamin Chiao and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason. Using uncensored communica-
tion channels to divert spam traffic. In Conf on Communications, Infor-
mation and Internet Policy (TPRC), 2006.
L.F. Cranor. P3p: making privacy policies more useful. Security & Privacy
Magazine, IEEE, 1(6):50–55, Nov.-Dec. 2003. ISSN 1540-7993.
Chrysanthos Dellarocas. Strategic manipulation of internet opinion forums:
Implications for consumers and firms. Management Science, 52(10):1577–
1593, 2006.
Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Neveen Awad, and X. Michael Zhang. xploring the
value of online reviews to organizations: Implications for revenue forecast-
ing and planning. In Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on
Information Systems, 2004.
Tom Fadial. Erratic wisdom, November 2007.
Thomas A. Finholt. Collaboratories. In B. Cronin, editor, Annual Review of
Information Science and Technology, volume 36, pages 74–107, Washing-
ton, D.C., 2002. American Society for Information Science.
Thomas A. Finholt. Collaboratories as a new form of scientific organization.
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 12:5–25, 2003.
30
Resnick Paul Friedman Eric J. The social cost of cheap pseudonyms. Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy, 10(2):173–199, June 2001. URL
http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jemstr/v10y2001i2p173-199.html.
Robert S. Gazzale. Giving gossips their due: Information provision in games
with private monitoring. Dept. of Economics, Williams College, 2005.
Heather Green. Digg argues it has ways to prevent manipulation, 2006.
Amy Harmon. Amazon glitch unmasks war of reviewers, February 2004.
Maxwell Harper, Xin Li, Yan Chen, and Joseph Konstan. An economic
model of user rating in an online recommender system. In User Modeling:
Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference, 2005.
Lian Jian and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason. Why share in peer-to-peer networks?
In Proceedings of Workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems
(NetEcon06), Ann Arbor, MI, June 2006. URL http://www.cs.duke.
edu/nicl/netecon06/. Available from http://www.cs.duke.edu/nicl/
netecon06/.
Kelvin Lancaster. A new approach to consumer theory. The Journal of
Political Economy, 74(2):132–157, 1966.
Joshua Lerner and Jean Tirole. Some simple economics of open source.
Journal of Industrial Economics, 50(2), June 2002. URL http://ideas.
repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v50y2002i2p197-234.html.
Lawrence Lessig and Paul Resnick. Zoning speech on the Internet: A legal
and technical model. Michigan Law Review, 98(2):395–431, 1999.
K. Ling, G. Beenen, P. Ludford, X. Wang, K. Chang, D. Cosley,
D. Frankowski, L. Terveen, A. M. Rashid, P. Resnick, and R Kraut.
Using social psychology to motivate contributions to online communi-
ties. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 10(4), 2005. URL
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol10/issue4/ling.html.
Thede Loder, Marshall Van Alstyne, and Rick Wash. An economic solution
to unsolicited communication. Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy,
6(1), 2006. Available from http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/
vol6/iss1/art2.
31
Jeffery K. MacKie-Mason, Juan F. Riveros, and Robert S. Gazzale. Pricing
and bundling electronic information goods: Experimental evidence. In
B. Compaine and I. Vogelsang, editors, The Internet Upheaval: Raising
Questions, Seeking Answers in Communications Policy. MIT Press, 2000.
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason. Economic Incentives. Marshall Cavendish, Tar-
rytown, NY, 2000.
Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen. Monopoly and product quality. Journal
of Economic Theory, 18(2):301–317, August 1978. URL http://ideas.
repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v18y1978i2p301-317.html.
Oded Nov. What motivates wikipedians, 2007. URL http:
//opensource.mit.edu/papers/Nov_Wikipedia_motivations_
opensource.mit.edu.pdf. Accepted for publication in the Com-
munications of the ACM.
Gary Olson and Judy Olson. Groupware and computer-supported cooper-
ative work. In J. A. Jacko and A. Sears, editors, The human-computer
interaction handbook: fundamentals, evolving technologies and emerging
applications, pages 583–595. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Mahwah,
NJ, USA, 2003. ISBN 0-8058-3838-4.
Tim O’Reilly. What is web 2.0?, 2005.
Emilee Rader and Rick Wash. Tagging with del.icio.us: Social or selfish? In
Computer Support Cooperative Work, 2006. Poster Session.
Al M. Rashid, Kimberly Ling, Regina D. Tassone, Paul Resnick, Robert
Kraut, and John Riedl. Motivating participation by displaying the value of
contribution. In CHI ’06: Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human
Factors in computing systems, pages 955–958, New York, NY, USA, 2006.
ACM Press. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1124772.1124915.
P. Resnick, R. Zeckhauser, J. Swanson, and K. Lockwood. The value of
reputation on ebay: A controlled experiment. Experimental Economics, 9
(2):79–101, 2006.
Paul Resnick and Hal R. Varian. Recommender systems. Commun. ACM, 40
(3):56–58, 1997. URL http://doi.acm.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.
1145/245108.245121.
32
Paul Resnick and Richard Zeckhauser. Trust among strangers in internet
transactions: Empirical analysis of ebay’s reputation system, the eco-
nomics of the internet and e-commerce. In Michael R. Baye, editor, Ad-
vances in Applied Microeconomics, volume 11. Elsevier Science, Amster-
dam, 2002.
Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, Eric Friedman, and Ko Kuwabara. Rep-
utation systems. Communications of the ACM, 43(12):45–48, 2000.
Reuters. Flickr to map the world’s latest photo hot spots, November 2007.
John G. Riley. Silver signals: Twenty-five years of screening and signaling.
Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2):432–478, 2001.
Greg Sandoval. Digg continues to battle phony stories, 2006.
Nigel Shadbolt, Tim Berners-Lee, and Wendy Hall. The semantic web revis-
ited. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 21(3):96–101, May/June 2006.
Joseph E. Stiglitz. The contributions of the economics of information to
twentieth century economics. QJE, pages 1441–1478, Nov 2000.
Mark Twain. The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. Harper and Brothers, New
York, 1903 author’s national edition edition, 1876.
Rick Wash and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason. Security when people matter:
Structuring incentives for user behavior. In International Conference on
Electronic Commerce (ICEC-07), Minneapolis, MN, August 2007. ACM.
Stuart L. Weibel and Traugott Koch. The dublin core metadata initiative:
Mission, current activities, and future directions. D-Lib Magazine, 6(12),
2000. ISSN 1082-9873.
Wikipedia contributors. Wikipedia, 2007.
33
Figure 1: User-contributed content in the life-cycle of information.
34
Figure 2: Upload bibliographic data to BibSonomy.
35
Figure 3: Search BibSonomy.
36
Figure 4: Select and download from BibSonomy in preferred format.
37
